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Abstract 
Law and economics has a potential to provide us with an uncommon and to the Czech 
jurisdiction often neglected point of view on laws. The aim of this paper is to apply economic 
theories on directors’ liability for breach of fiduciary duties and to consider its consequences on 
the economic efficiency of companies. The critical question is whether not having such liability 
could provoke an increase of wealth of all stakeholders. The paper also aims to come up with 
instruments capable of minimizing the lost caused to companies by mandatory rules regarding 
director’s liability. At the end of the thesis, the Czech laws regarding the director’s liability for 
breach of fiduciary duties are analyzed in the point of view of economic analysis. The analysis is 
followed by proposition of instruments that could make companies operating in Czech legal 
environment more effective. 
Directors’ liability, which can result in an aversion to make risky decisions, can cause 
significant losses to companies (so called agency costs). For that reason, the possibility to 
determine the scope of director’s liability given to shareholders can have, in some cases, positive 
effect on the company’s efficiency. The paper concludes that the possibility to exclude director’s 
liability for breach of duty of loyalty can hardly be effective for the society. However, it is not an 
easy task to give a clear conclusion about the possibility to exclude the duty of care. It appears 
that non-legal instruments capable to reduce agency costs could be effective in this case. 
Nevertheless, the risk of negative outcomes for other stakeholders is also present. 
 Even in case of keeping the mandatory liability rules there are instruments that could 
considerably reduce the costs incurred by them. One of them is the possibility to insure directors 
against the liability for breach of fiduciary duties, or better said the duty of care. Moreover, 
significant power in this matter is given to judges who can by lenient decisions also substantially 
decrease the losses caused by mandatory liability rules. 
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